Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University

Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law
Hofstra Law Faculty Scholarship
1976

The Professional Obligation to Chase Ambulances
Monroe H. Freedman
Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship

Recommended Citation
Monroe H. Freedman, The Professional Obligation to Chase Ambulances, 2 Litigation 41 (1976)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship/469

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Hofstra Law Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra
Law. For more information, please contact lawlas@hofstra.edu.

Litigation
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The
Professional
Obligation
toChase
Ambulances
by Monroe HK Freedman
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Ernest Gene Gunn, a five-year-old
boy, was seriously injured as a result
of negligent driving attributed to
John 1. Washek. Shortly after the
accident, the boy's mother was visited
at home by an adjuster from Mr.
Washek's insurance company. The
adjuster told her that there was no
need to retain an attorney, because
the company would make a settlement as soon as the boy was out of his
doctor's care; if Ms. Gunn were not
satisfied at that time, she could retain
an attorney and file suit.
The boy's injuries were sufficiently
severe to require a doctor's care for 23
months. At the end of that time Ms.
Gunn made repeated efforts to reach
the insurance company adjuster, but
without success. She then retained a
lawyer, who promptly filed suit for
her. Ms. Gunn's boy never did have
his day in court, however, because the
attorneys for the insurance company
successfully pleaded a two-year statute of limitations. Gunn v. Washek,
405 Pa. 521, 176 A.2d 635 (1961).
The Gunn case illustrates two
important issues of professional
responsibility which, unfortunately,
have never been adequately dealt with
by the organized bar. What if counsel
was, in advance, aware of (or
prompted) the adjuster's actions? For
a lawyer to participate in a scheme to
trick a lay person out of effective
representation of counsel would
constitute counseling or assisting the
client in fraudulent conduct in violation of the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility. There is reason to
believe, however, that it is not
uncommon for some lawyers, acting
The authoris Dean and ProfessorofLaw of
Hofstra University and a frequent contributor
to Litigation. He is also Chairmanof the Legal
Ethics Committee of the District of Columbia
Bar. This article was adapted from Dean
Freedman's recent book, Lawyer's Ethics in
an Adversary System (Bobbs-Merrill 1975).
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alone or in connivance with insurance
adjusters, to take advantage of claimants' ignorance and to mislead them
into foregoing legal rights. Nevertheless, it is rare, if ever, that a lawyer
has been disciplined for such perversion of professional knowledge and
skills.
On the contrary, the thrust of bar
discipline has been directed toward
restricting lay persons' knowledge of
their rights and their access to legal
redress. For example, not long after
Ms. Gunn had lost her fight to
overcome the effects of the insurance
adjuster's deceitful actions, the Committee of Censors of the Philadelphia Bar Association undertook a
$125,000 investigation-not of insurance adjusters, but of "unethical"
solicitation of clients by plaintiffs'
lawyers. The resulting report recognized the need on behalf of plaintiffs
"to counter the activity of [insurance]
carriers' adjusters," but casually suggested that that problem could be
dealt with "by the exercise of restraint
on the part of carriers." The report
also acknowledged the propriety and
"social value" of automobile wrecking companies listening to police calls
to be the first to arrive at accident
scenes to carry off the damaged
vehicles, but it found no justification
at all in a similar effort directed
toward protecting the legal rights of
the injured people.
The bases for disciplinary action
that interfere with lawyers' efforts to
advise people of their rights are, of
course, the ABA Code strictures
against advertising and solicitation.
Those provisions continue longstanding rules against maintenance,
champerty and barratry-commonly
referred to as ambulance chasing or
stirring up litigation. The principal
purpose of the anti-solicitation rules
is to limit competition among lawyers. Illustrative is a case permitting
a bar association to advertise its law-

yer referral service in a newspaper.
The court expressly justified its decision on the ground that the real evil
in advertising is competition among
lawyers, which is not present when
the bar advertises as a whole. Jacksonville Bar Ass'n v. Wilson, 102
So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1958).
A number of leading authorities
have criticized the anti-solicitation
rules, therefore, as unrelated to
professional ethics, as distinguished
from what Harvard Law Professor
Andrew Kaufman calls "the rules of a
guild." That is, they are directed
against competition rather than for
the maintenance of moral standards
in the public interest. Other
authorities have also emphasized the
effect of those rules in protecting
established lawyers and large firms
from undesired competition from
young lawyers and small firms.

Objections
Nevertheless, there are those who
object that advertising for clients
would "degrade the profession," and
the ABA Code informs us that:
"History has demonstrated that
public confidence in the legal system
is best preserved by strict, selfimposed controls over, rather than
by unlimited, advertising." Ethical
Consideration 2-9. No historical
reference is provided, however, to
support that assertion. Similarly, the
Philadelphia report, referred to
above, suggests that solicitation of
clients in violation of the rules has led
to intense public dissatisfaction with
the bar. In fact, the opposite may be
true-that is, that dissatisfaction
with the bar stems in major part from
lawyers' aloofness and from their
failure to reach out to those whom
they purport to serve.
For example, in a survey conducted
by two law professors at the
University of Edinburgh for the Law
Society of Scotland in 1973, people
were asked whether they would resent
or welcome an attorney who
approached them to offer legal
services in six situations (if you were
in an accident; if you were considering buying a house; if you were going
into a new business venture; etc.).
The survey revealed that less than two
percent of the people in the survey
would resent an attorney's contact,
while about half would welcome the

unrequested proffer of services by an
attorney in all six cases. Generally,
about 70 percent fell in the
"welcome" category. Moreover, the
least well-educated people were those
who, most of all, would welcome
being solicited by attorneys. The
study concludes: "The extraordinarily high proportions of people who
would welcome the solicitor's initiating contact in the different situations we have posed must seriously
question many commonly held
assumptions about the correct stance
for members of the profession. Taken
with the data noted which showed
that few members of the public have
adequate knowledge of the services
solicitors could provide, and would
like to know about these (i.e., want
more advertisement), there is a
coherent and very emphatic call for a
more active and positive legal
profession."
A similar conclusion was reached
in 1973 by the Special Committee on
Legal Ethics of the Canadian Bar
Association. The committee found
that the increasing complexity and
specialization in law make it more
and more difficult for a potential
client to have confidence in the
selection of a lawyer. Accordingly,
the committee recommended that the
permitted forms of advertising by
attorneys "should be enlarged and
extended" to include "publication of
professional cards, in an institutional
form in newspapers, shopping center
guides, and other like publications."
Those who object to solicitation of
clients are typically ignorant of the
fact that the strictures against it are
themselves only minor exceptions to
the more fundamental rule of professional responsibility expressed in
Canon Two of the Code of Professional Responsibility: "A Lawyer
Should Assist the Legal Profession in
Fulfilling Its Duty to Make Legal
Counsel Available." The Code thus
recognizes an affirmative obligation
of the profession to provide access to
the legal system-and that access,
presumably, is for the benefit of all
people, not just a select few.
Oddly enough, however, the solicitation limitation appears in the
Disciplinary Rules under that same
Canon Two. Disciplinary Rule 2-104
reads, in part: "A lawyer who has
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given unsolicited advice to a layman
that he should obtain counsel or take
legal action shall not accept employment resulting from that advice ...... Disciplinary Rule 2-103
says: "A lawyer shall not recommend
employment as a private practitioner
of himself, his partner, or associate to
a nonlawyer who has not sought his
advice."
Those rules appear on first reading
to be broad and absolute. But they
are practically meaningless-at least
for a particular class of lawyers and
clients-because of certain exceptions to the anti-solicitation rules. For
example, DR 2-104 provides further
that: "A lawyer [who has volunteered
advice] may accept employment by a
close friend, relative, [or a] former
client .

. . . "That

refinement means

that those who are accustomed to
retaining lawyers, say, for their tax
or estate work, and those who have
attorneys as relatives and friends, are
the kind of people who can be
solicited despite the rule. As to that
socioeconomic class of people, there
is no impropriety in solicitation. In
addition, consistent with DR 2-104,
lawyers have been known to take tax
deductions for membership fees in
country clubs on the ground that such
fees are an ordinary and necessary
business expense-that is, a means
for discreetly soliciting business. One
prominent federal judge resigned
from several exclusive clubs upon
going on the bench, explaining to
friends that he no longer needed to
attract clients.

Law Lists
Another device approved by the
ABA for soliciting clients is the law
list, such as in the impressive volumes
of Martindale-Hubbell.This is purely
and simply a self-laudatory advertisement, euphemistically called a
"card," and directed to potential
clients. Yet not every attorney is
permitted to advertise his or her
professional autobiography, prestigious associations and important
clients in Martindale-Hubbell. One
must await an invitation from the
publisher to apply for an "a" rating,
which can be achieved only upon submission of favorable references from
16 judges and attorneys who have
themselves already received an "a"
rating. For all other members of the

profession, Martindale-Hubbellis a
closed book.
A similar service is The Attorneys'
Register. The brochure for that
publication boasts that the register
holds a certificate of compliance from
the American Bar Association, and
explains that: "The primary purpose
of The Attorneys' Register is to
continue to be a valuable forwarding
medium aimed at securing SUBSTANTIAL legal business for our
listees . . . ." (The word SUBSTANTIAL is written in capital letters
throughout the brochure.) Further, it
offers the attorney "an opportunity to
be recognized in association with
other reputable members of the Bar,"
and the publishers promise that they
will do "everything they properly can
to encourage active forwardings to
our listees." The brochure also
provides a partial list of "important
corporations which . . . have requested, and will receive, a copy of
our current edition . . . for use when
seeking qualified . . . counsel." The
list contains about 100 corporations, including Abbott Laboratories,
American Sugar, Continental Can,
DuPont, General Electric, and U.S.
Plywood-corporations that will look
for the attorney's name and qualifications in the paid advertisement in the
register. In addition, the register is
distributed free to "a careful selection
of banks and trust companies, important industrial corporations, insurance companies, financing institutions, and the like, who are believed
to be prolific forwarders of SUBSTANTIAL legal matters."

How to Solicit
That is the way solicitation is
carried on with impunity by lawyers
seeking to represent those of wealth
and privilege, such as John J.
Washek's insurance company. The
problem of impropriety arises, of
course, only for those who seek to
represent that other socioeconomic
group typified by the mother of
Ernest Gene Gunn or, say, by tenants
as distinguished from landlords, or
by consumers as distinguished from
manufacturers. For such unsophisticates-that is for those who are most
in need of that access to the legal
system which is promised by Canon
Two-the organized bar, through its
disciplinary rules and actions,

discourages any realistic opportunity
to take controversies "out of the
streets and into the courtrooms."
Imagine, for example, the following situation. A woman arrives at a
metropolitan courthouse holding a
small boy by the hand. She speaks
almost no English at all. She is
intimidated by the imposing surroundings, and she is frightened and
confused. All that she knows is that
she is required to be some place in
that building because her son has
been arrested or her landlord is
attempting to evict her family. People
brush by her, concerned with their
own problems. Then a man appears,
smiles at her, and asks her in her own
language whether he can help her.
Through him, she meets and retains
the man's employer, a lawyer who
guides her to the proper place and
who competently represents her
interests for a reasonable fee. In my
view, that lawyer should have been
given a citation as Attorney of the
Year. Instead, he was prosecuted as a
criminal, convicted of a misdemeanor of soliciting business on behalf of
an attorney, subjected to disciplinary
proceedings, and publicly censured
by the court. In re Solomon Cohn,
reported in the New York Law
Journal,Feb. 19, 1974, p. 1, cols. 6-7.
If the profession has an obligation to "[Fulfill] Its Duty to Make
Legal Counsel Available," strictures
against advertising and soliciting
are precisely the wrong way to go
about it. Instead, attorneys have a
professional duty to stir up litigation
when they are acting to advise people,
who may be ignorant of their rights,
to seek justice in the courts. As
expressed by one authority:
We

must . . . discard . . . the

assumption of Medieval Society,
that a law suit is an evil in itself.
It is hard to see how either the
legal profession or our court
machinery can justify its existence, if we go on the assumption
that it is always better to suffer
a wrong than to redress it by
litigation. .

.

. If we have so little

confidence in the process of law
as to think otherwise, we shall do
well to consider a fundamental
overhauling of our system. M.
Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 72
(1935).
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Fortunately, there is authority, as
well as notions of humanity, equal
protection, freedom of speech, and
the right to petition, in support of the
view that the legal system exists to be
used by people and that people who
need legal advice are entitled to have
it. Indeed, the new ABA Code at one
point makes such advice a matter of
professional duty: "The legal profession should assist laymen to recognize
legal problems because such problems may not be self-revealing and
often are not timely noticed." Ethical
Consideration 2-2. Advice regarding
legal rights is therefore held proper
when it is "motivated by a desire to
protect one who does not recognize
that he may have legal problems or
who is ignorant of his legal rights or
obligations." Ethical Consideration
2-3.

Mixed Motives
The Code does suggest that an
attorney should not solicit a client
solely for the purpose of obtaining a
fee. However, when the lawyer's
motives are mixed-that is, when the
attorney acts with both a proper
motive (to provide needed advice) and
an "improper" motive (to earn a fee)
-it is the proper motive that is determinative. For example, during the
New Deal period, an organization
was formed called the Liberty
League, which was a group of lawyers
opposed to such New Deal innovations as the National Labor Relations
Act. The League published advertisements expressing its view that the Act
was unconstitutional and offering to
represent anyone who wanted to
litigate against it. In Formal Opinion
No. 148, the Committee on Professional Ethics of the American Bar
Association held that the lawyers'
activities were not only professionally
proper but "wholesome and beneficial." Moreover, the committee made
it clear that the propriety of the
advertisement would not be affected
by a motive on the part of the lawyers
to serve the interests of fee-paying
clients:
We need not assume that these
lawyers were actuated solely by
altruistic motives. It would be
extraordinary indeed if some of
the lawyers in the list do not have
some clients whose rights may be
adversely affected by the legisla-

tion which the lawyers condemn,
but their right to organize and
declare their views cannot for
that reason be denied, and no
ethical principle is thereby violated.
It is clear, therefore, that even though
an attorney may receive compensation, the solicitation of a client is not
unethical if the client might otherwise
have lost the opportunity to vindicate
legal rights through ignorance of the
law or of the availability of effective
legal services.
Constitutional Issue
In addition, the Supreme Court
has held in a series of cases of major
importance that rules of professional
ethics must give way to constitutional
rights. For example, the case of
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963), considered solicitation of
clients in the context of efforts of the
NAACP to recruit plaintiffs for
school desegregation cases. The
NAACP called a series of meetings,
inviting not only its members and not
only poor people, but all members of
the community. At those meetings,
the organization's paid staff attorneys took the platform to urge those
present to authorize the lawyers to sue
in their behalf. The NAACP maintained the ensuing litigation by defraying all expenses, regardless of the
financial means of a particular plaintiff.
Virginia contended that the
NAACP's activities constituted improper solicitation under a state
statute and fell within the traditional
state power to regulate professional
conduct. The Supreme Court held,
however, that "the State's attempt to
equate the activities of the NAACP
and its lawyers with common-law
barratry, maintenance and champerty, and to outlaw them accordingly,
cannot obscure the serious encroachment . . . upon protected freedoms
of expression." 371 U.S. at 438. The
Court concluded: "Thus it is no
answer to the constitutional claims
asserted by petitioner to say, as the
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
has said, that the purpose of these
regulations was merely to insure high
professional standards and not to
curtail free expression. For a State
may not, under the guise of prohibit-

ing professional misconduct, ignore
constitutional rights." 371 U.S. at
438-39.
Subsequently, in Brotherhood of
RailroadTrainmen v. Virginia ex rel.
VirginiaState Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964),
the Supreme Court considered the
question of solicitation in a case in
which a union's legal services plan
resulted in channeling all or substantially all of the railroad workers'
personal injury claims, on a private
fee basis, to lawyers selected by the
union and touted in its literature and
at meetings. The Court again upheld the solicitation on constitutional grounds, despite the objection
of the two dissenting justices that by
giving constitutional protection to the
solicitation of personal injury claims,
the Court "relegates the practice of
law to the level of a commercial enterprise," "degrades the profession,"
and "contravenes both the accepted
ethics of the profession and the
statutory and judicial rules of acceptable conduct." 377 U.S. at 9 (Clark,
J., dissenting).
In United Mine Workers v. Illinois
State BarAss'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967),
the Supreme Court dealt with the
argument that Button should be
limited to litigation involving major
political issues and not be extended to
personal injury cases. The Court held
that: "The litigation in question is, of
course, not bound up with political
matters of acute social moment, as in
Button, but the First Amendment
does not protect speech and assembly
only to the extent it can be
characterized as political. 'Great
secular causes, with small ones, are
guarded ....
'" 389 U.S. at 223.
Finally, in United Transportation
Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576
(1971), the Court reversed a state
injunction designed, in Justice
Harlan's words, "to fend against
,ambulance chasing'." 401 U.S. at
597 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In that
case, a union paid investigators to
keep track of accidents, to visit
injured members, taking contingent
fee contracts with them, and to urge
the members to engage named
private attorneys who were selected
by the union and who had agreed to
charge a fee set by prior agreement
with the union. The investigators
were also paid by the union for any
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time and expenses incurred in
transporting potential clients to the
designated lawyers' offices to enter
retainer agreements.
In approving that arrangement,
the Court reiterated that "collective
activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a
fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment." 401
U.S. at 585. What is important to
bear in mind, however, is that: (1) the
attorneys in question were not
in-house counsel for the union, but
were private practitioners; (2) the
attorneys earned substantial fees; (3)
the cases were not "public interest"
cases in the restricted sense, but were
ordinary personal injury cases; and
(4) the attorneys were retained as a
result of the activities of "investigators," paid by the union, whose job it
was to find out where accidents had
occurred, to visit the victims as
promptly as possible, to "tout" the
particular lawyers and, if necessary,
to take the victim to the lawyers'
office to get a contingent fee contract
signed.
Undecided Questions
The only question not decided by
the Court was whether the investigators could properly have been paid
directly by the lawyers. The
dissenting justices would have
disapproved it, while the majority
simply did not reach that issue, on the
ground that it was not in the record
before them. It is difficult, however,
to see why a significant distinction
should turn upon who pays the
investigator. An unsophisticated
person like Ms. Gunn needs
information about the availability of
legal services, regardless of whether
she is a member of a union and
regardless of who pays her informant.
Furthermore, although the Court
happened to be dealing in the union
cases with group legal services, the
people solicited in Button were not
limited to members of NAACP.
Not long ago, the Supreme Court
decided in Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar. 421 U.S. 773 (1975), that the
publication and enforcement by bar
associations of minimum fee schedules violate the Sherman Act. The
principal issue in Goldfarb was
(Pleaseturn to page 54)

introduce yourself and your client.
The customary way to begin an
opening statement, if you have not
already been introduced to the jury
satisfactorily during voir dire, is to
introduce yourself, your client, and,
depending on the sense of etiquette in
the community, your opposing
counsel as well. But there is an argument that the custom ought to be
altered slightly. Although it is not the
sort of practice that will suit everyone,
opening statements with delayed
introductions can be very effective. If
the opening begins with the theme
and is followed by a short chronology
which leads up to how you were
contacted by your client, stating your
name to the jury can come slightly
after the theme quite comfortably.
Whether you introduce yourself at the
very first or wait a minute or two, the
theme should be one of the first things
the jury hears.

'Lawyer's Talk'
Another custom in making opening statements is even more deserving
of re-examination: the remark that
the opening statement is "only
lawyer's talk." The practice which
has developed among many lawyers is
to discount the opening statement
while making it, saying something
like this:
"Nothing I tell you now or what
Mr. Randolf is going to say is
evidence in this case. Instead, what
you must pay attention to and the
only thing you are justified in basing
your verdict on is testimony you hear
from that witness stand."
James Jeans argues that this
practice is an example of "mimicking
mediocrity," and that no one who
wants to tell a convincing story should
start out by asking his audience to
disregard what he is saying. Jeans,
TRIAL ADVOCACY 205-06 (1975).
The most that can be said for this
"lawyer's talk" routine is that it is an
anticipatory defense to the opposition
saying much the same thing and
carrying the suggestion that you were
somehow trying to convince the jury
that what you were saying was
evidence. But self-protection does not
need to be so negative. Instead, as you
progress into the body of your
opening statement, you can refer to
the testimony and other evidence
which is to come. You can make the

point affirmatively that the evidence
will justify the verdict without
running down what you are doing.
Just how detailed you should be in
discussing what testimony the jury
will hear is another problem. The
danger is that of overstatement. If
you make specific promises to the
jury, you may be embarrassed to hear
them thrown back at you at the end of
the case if you do not produce the
evidence as promised. This can raise
the possibility of the jurors concluding that you were careless about your
case, that you tried to mislead them,
or that you have failed to prove an
essential element of your case, even
though that is not at all true. If you
promise to prove something, the jury
may think you have to prove it to win.
The problem of how detailed an
opening statement should be is
discussed further in Keeton, TRIAL
TACTICS AND METHODS 270-72 (2d
ed. 1973).
On the other hand, one of the most
important functions of an opening
statement is to let the jurors know
what is coming, and alert them to
what they should look for as the trial
unfolds. Because you cannot always
call witnesses in the order you would
like and the flow of direct examination will be broken up by objections
and cross-examination, it is generally
a good idea to tell the jury what
witnesses you are going to call and
give an understandable picture of
what you expect the evidence to show.
Moreover, it can be crucial not to be
too cautious in what you say so that
you do not tell the jury enough. If it is
evident from your opening statement
that you do not have a case, many
jurisdictions permit the trial court to
grant a directed verdict after the
opening statement. The lesson is
straightforward enough: be certain to
state a prima facie case in your
opening.
While the opening statement is a
good point for the plaintiff to start
establishing liability, it is usually not
a good place to discuss the amount of
damages sought, particularly in
personal injury cases where you are
seeking large awards. Convincing a
jury that the plaintiff should receive,
for example, two or three hundred
thousand dollars takes time, and even
talking about that amount of money
with them before they have seen the
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justification for it is dangerous.
Finally, you should use the opening
statement to start a process that will
continue through the entire trial:
making your client a real person
rather than a procedural entity like a
client, plaintiff or defendant. Those
are terms you reserve for the other
side. Referring to an individual
litigant by name is easy, natural and
too often neglected. Making a
corporation come alive is harder, but
worth the effort. The words you
choose, the person you select to sit
at counsel table with you, as well as
your other actions, should all add up
to making the jury think of the
corporation as the very real person
sitting next to you.

Litigation
Ethics
(Continuedfrom page 44)
whether the practice of law, as a
"learned profession," is outside the
scope of the Sherman Act, which is
concerned with "trade or commerce." The Supreme Court held
that the sale of a service for money is
"commerce," and went on to observe
that, "[i]t is no disparagement of the
practice of law as a profession to
acknowledge that it has this business
aspect ......
421 U.S. at 787. The
Court also noted that, "[i]n the
modern world it cannot be denied
that the activities of lawyers play an
important part in commercial intercourse, and that anticompetitive
activities by lawyers may exert a
restraint on commerce." 421 U.S. at
788.

No Dissent
The Goldfarb opinion was written
by Chief Justice Burger and there
was, remarkably, not a single dissent.
In addition, the Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice has
adopted the position that a proscription of advertising and solicitation by
lawyers also violates the Sherman
Act.
On the same day that Goldfarb was
decided, the Supreme Court handed
down an opinion in Bigelow v.

Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), a case
which has not attracted as much
attention as Goldfarb in connection
with advertising and solicitation by
lawyers, but which is of far more
significance. In Bigelow, the defendant was convicted of violating a
provision of the Virginia antiabortion statute by publishing an
advertisement offering to make
low-cost arrangements for legal
abortions in New York. The importance of the Bigelow case to the issue
of advertising by lawyers is emphasized by the similarity between arguments typically made in support of
the anti-advertising provisions of the
ABA Code and the arguments made
by the Virginia Supreme Court in
affirming Bigelow's conviction. That
court held that the advertisement
"'clearly exceeded an informational
status' and 'constituted an active
offer to perform a service, rather than
a passive statement of fact.' " 421
U.S. at 814. In rejecting Bigelow's
First Amendment claim, the Virginia
court said that a "'commercial
advertisement .

.

. may be constitu-

tionally prohibited by the state,'"
particularly "'where, as here, the
advertising relates to the medicalhealth field,' " i.e., a professional
area in which the state's regulatory
power presumably would be at its
maximum. Id. In addition, the court
noted that the purpose of the statute
was to insure that pregnant women in
Virginia, making decisions with
respect to abortions, did so "'without
the commercial advertising pressure
usually incidental to the sale of a box
of soap powder.' " Id. Those, of
course, are precisely the kinds of
arguments that are made in support
of regulations against advertising by
lawyers.
Significantly, in striking down the
Virginia statute on First Amendment
grounds, the Supreme Court relied on
Button for the proposition that a state
cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights simply by labeling
the speech "solicitation" or "commerical advertising." In the course of
reaching that conclusion, the Court
severely restricted, if it did not overrule, Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316
U.S. 52 (1942), which had suggested
that commercial advertising was not
fully protected by the First Amendment.

Finally, the Court made a strong
bridge between the protected advertising in Bigelow and advertising by
lawyers, by stressing the fact that the
Bigelow advertisement contained information about legal issues:
Viewed in its entirety, the advertisement conveyed information
of potential interest and value to
a diverse audience-not only to
readers possibly in need of the
services offered, but also to those
with a general curiosity about, or
genuine interest in, the subject
matter or the law of another
State and its development, and
to readers seeking reform in
Virginia. .

.

. Also, the activity

advertised pertained to constitutional interests. [Citations
omitted.] Thus, in this case,
appellant's First Amendment
interests coincided with the constitutional interests of the
general public. 421 U.S. at 822.
Thus, the Bigelow advertisement
was given First Amendment Protection expressly because it was directed
to a "diverse audience" (not just the
membership of an association),
conveying information to those with a
"general curiosity about, or genuine
interest in . . . the law . . . and its
development. . . ."Presumably, that

same language would be descriptive
of any advertisements offering legal
services. Moreover, the reference in
the Bigelow advertisement to the fact
that abortions are legal in New York
was made only in passing. Certainly
the communication of legal information ("Abortions are legal in New
York") was quite limited, and there
was no explicit suggestion of the
desirability of law reform. In the
same sense, therefore, any advertisement relating to the availability of
legal services would convey information of "potential interest and value"
to people having a "general curiosity"
about the law, its development, or law
reform.
It seems abundantly clear, therefore, that the present provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility,
forbidding advertising and solicitation by lawyers, are constitutionally
invalid.
We began with Gunn v. Washek,
and it is an appropriate case with
which to close. If lawyers are to take
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seriously the overriding rule expressed in Canon Two, the bar must
reverse the pattern illustrated by
Gunn. First, we must vigorously
discipline attorneys who abuse their
training, skills, and status by
misleading, overbearing, or overreaching unrepresented lay people.
Second, we must encourage, rather
than forbid, lawyers to seek out
people like Ms. Gunn who have legal
rights and who may, by ignorance, be
deprived of access to the legal system.
In short, we should recognize that
when Ernest Gene Gunn was injured
by John J. Washek, the legal profession failed doubly in its duties when
an insurance adjuster rather than a
plaintiff s attorney was the first to call
on Ms. Gunn.

Ijial
Balloon
(Continuedfrom page 4)
choosing. And the court's reliance
upon the appearance of impropriety
seems a weak reed indeed. If a
criminal lawyer were to govern his
conduct upon what appearances were
in the eye of the public, he would be
hard pressed ever to represent any
unpopular client or cause.
The Source of the Fee. Few attorneys would doubt the impropriety of a
fee arrangement whereby a lawyer, to
defend an accused kidnapper, took
the marked ransom money. That
example might cause one to
formulate a rule that a lawyer may not
ethically accept, as a fee, money
which he knows, or should know,
constitutes the proceeds of a crime.
Would such a rule be reasonable or
proper?

'Dirty Money'
I suppose that the public might say
that a lawyer should never accept
"dirty money." But once again, a
number of distinctions must be
made. Suppose, for example, a man
charged with a bank robbery netting
$10,000 offers to pay his attorney a
fee of that very amount. Must the
attorney first investigate how the
defendant came by that sum before
he agrees to accept it? Suppose he

